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Kes be kes enqullal be-egrwa tihedalech
Little by little, the egg begins to walk
(Ethiopian saying)
Attention to gender equality remains an important develop-
ment goal. The importance of gender equality is highlighted in
its prominence in the United Nations Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs), which have been commonly accepted
as a framework for measuring development progress. Of the
eight goals, four are directly related to gender: achieving uni-
versal primary education, promoting gender equality and the
empowerment of women, reducing infant and child mortality,
and improving maternal health. Closing gender gaps—which
tend to favor males—has also been seen to contribute to
women’s empowerment. However, the term empowerment
refers to a broad concept that is used diﬀerently by various
writers, depending on the context or circumstance (see
Kabeer (2001) and Ibrahim and Alkire (2007) for discussions
and a review of concepts).
Other arguments for reducing the gender gap revolve around
improving productivity and increasing eﬃciency, improved
outcomes for the next generation, and more representative
decision making, which are emphasized by Food and Agricul-
ture Organization (FAO, 2011) and the World Bank (World
Bank, 2011) in their ﬂagship publications. Quisumbing et al.
(2014) argue that the motivations for closing the gender gap
are not mutually exclusive; rather, they reinforce each other.
The linkages between women’s empowerment and increased
productivity and food security are emphasized by Alkire
et al. (2013) and Sraboni, Malapit, Quisumbing, and Ahmed
(2014), in their analysis of the newly developed Women’s
Empowerment in Agriculture Index. Closing the gender gap
in assets—allowing women to own and control productive
assets—both increases women’s productivity and increases
their self-esteem. A woman who is empowered to make deci-
sions regarding what to plant and what (and how many) inputs
to apply on her plot is likely to be more productive in agricul-
ture. Similarly, an empowered woman is likely to be better able
to ensure her children’s health and nutrition because she is able
to take care of her own physical and mental well-being (see406Smith, Ramakrishnan, Ndiaye, Haddad, and Martorell
(2003) and studies reviewed therein). Thus, regardless of
whether eﬃciency, equity, or both are stated development
objectives, various studies have shown that reducing gender
gaps is key to meeting these goals.
If closing the gender gap is such an important development
objective, are there complementarities with other development
goals that could be exploited? Could diﬀerent policy reforms
have reinforcing impacts on gender equality? This paper
explores the complementarity of two diﬀerent reform pro-
cesses in Ethiopia that began in the 2000s: the promulgation
of the revised Family Code in 2000, and the community-based
land registration eﬀorts, which started in 2003. North’s (1990)
theory of institutional change argues that institutions change
incrementally rather than in a discontinuous fashion because
they are embedded in formal and informal constraints in soci-
eties. Although rules may change overnight because of politi-
cal or judicial decisions, informal constraints are deeply rooted
in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct, and thus change
more slowly in response to deliberate policies (North, 1990, p.
6). However, institutional change may be reinforcing as well as
path dependent (North, 1990, p. 99).
The possibility of mutually reinforcing policy reforms is rel-
evant to Ethiopia, where gender norms related to property
ownership, inheritance, and the division of assets after divorce
favor men (Fafchamps & Quisumbing, 2002, 2005). Such gen-
der disparities have important welfare consequences. Dercon
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part of Ethiopia, where customary laws governing settlement
at divorce are biased against women, suﬀer a greater deterio-
ration in their body mass index when illness shocks occur.
Fafchamps, Kebede, and Quisumbing (2009) ﬁnd that the rel-
ative nutrition of spouses is associated with correlates of bar-
gaining power, such as cognitive ability, independent sources
of income, and devolution of assets upon divorce, and that
several dimensions of female empowerment beneﬁt the nutri-
tion and education level of children. These results in Ethiopia
are corroborated by ﬁndings in Asia and Latin America: in
India, Panda and Agarwal (2005) ﬁnd that women owning
immovable property (land or a house) face a signiﬁcantly
lower risk of marital violence than propertyless women. In
Nepal, women who own land are signiﬁcantly more likely to
have more say in household decisions, a measure of empower-
ment, and children whose mothers own land are less likely to
be severely underweight (Allendorf 2007). Menon, van der
Meulen Rodgers, and Nguyen (2014) ﬁnd that land titling
for women in Vietnam led to improvements in child health
and education, and that these eﬀects were stronger than in
households with male-only or jointly held land use rights.
Joint property rights for spouses and cohabitants in Peru
had signiﬁcant positive eﬀects on women’s empowerment, with
the eﬀects strongest for increasing women’s decisions on large
investments and agriculture, and less impact on daily expendi-
tures, as market operations are traditionally seen as a female
responsibility anyway (Wiig, 2013).
In this paper we use data from the Ethiopian Rural House-
hold Survey (ERHS) to show how two reforms—the changes
in the Family Code implemented in 2000 and the commu-
nity-based land registration, undertaken since 2003—may
have created conditions for gender-sensitive reforms to rein-
force each other. To assess whether these reforms have the
potential to have diﬀerential impacts on households, depend-
ing on the sex of the household head, household asset owner-
ship, and other characteristics, we begin by examining how
these household characteristics are correlated with changes
in women’s perceptions regarding allocation of assets upon
divorce, and knowledge of and participation in the land regis-
tration process. We then analyze whether the two reforms
were complementary. We use data from the 1997, 2004, and
2009 rounds of the ERHS, which covered approximately
1,300 households in 15 villages all across Ethiopia. The timing
of the survey rounds, before and after these signiﬁcant policy
changes in Ethiopia, enables us to examine the potential com-
plementarity of these reforms.2. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: CONCEPTS AND
RECENT ETHIOPIAN EXPERIENCE
(a) A conceptual framework for understanding institutional
change
In his 1990 book, Nobel laureate Douglass C. North pro-
poses a theory of institutional change that examines the inter-
action between formal and informal constraints to economic
and political behavior. Among these constraints, one of the
most important is property rights (North, 1990, p. 33).
According to North (1990, p. 40), formal laws and property
rights are only a small portion of the rules that govern society;
informal constraints are probably more important and numer-
ous in practice, come from socially transmitted information,
and are considered part of culture. Although not discussed
by North, gender norms determine how diﬀerent culturesdeﬁne men’s and women’s property rights and are part of
the institutional framework that deﬁnes customs surrounding
marriage (and marital dissolution), inheritance, and produc-
tion relations. Because there are a large number of speciﬁc
(formal, but mostly informal) constraints that aﬀect a particu-
lar choice, institutions tend to change very slowly. Signiﬁcant
changes in the institutional framework involve changes in con-
straints, not only in legal constraints but also in norms of
behavior. Only when it is in the interest of those with suﬃcient
bargaining power to alter the formal rules will there be major
changes in the formal institutional framework.
Yet, cultures do change over time. North (1990, p. 94) draws
from work by Arthur (1989), who argues that small historical
events can lead to one technology winning out over another,
and thus, for changes to be self-reinforcing. If there are no
increasing returns to institutions and markets are competitive,
institutions do not matter. But, with increasing returns, all the
self-reinforcing mechanisms hypothesized apply. In the con-
text of institutional change, these mechanisms apply when
there are: (1) large setup costs when institutions are set up
for the ﬁrst time (or when drastic changes are put into place);
(2) signiﬁcant learning eﬀects for organizations that arise in
consequence of the opportunity set provided by the institu-
tional framework; (3) coordination eﬀects directly via con-
tracts with other organizations, and indirectly by induced
investment through the polity in complementary activities;
and (4) formal rules that result in the creation of a variety
of informal constraints that modify the formal rules and
extend them to a variety of speciﬁc applications. Adaptive
expectations occur because increased prevalence of contract-
ing based on a speciﬁc institution will reduce uncertainties
about the permanence of that rule. In short, the interdepen-
dent web of an institutional matrix produces massive increas-
ing returns.
One can apply this reasoning to the promulgation and imple-
mentation of policy reforms that promote gender equality and
identify ways these self-reinforcing mechanisms could manifest
themselves. First, institutional reforms, particularly constitu-
tional reform or changes in statutory law, typically take time
because of the need to build a constituency to support these
changes, whether in legislative bodies or in the electorate. Sec-
ond, other government agencies, as well as civil society organi-
zations, gear up to implement these reforms, as well as increase
knowledge of the reforms through legal literacy campaigns.
Third, these reforms may lead to changes in behavior of elected
oﬃcials and civil servants: for example, courts of law may rule
based on the new guidelines regarding the settlement of marital
disputes; once both spouses are allowed to own property
equally, there may be support for eﬀorts to register land jointly
in men’s and women’s names. Finally, the formal rules that
remove gender-based discrimination in property rights may
induce parents to change their views toward their sons and
daughters, rewrite wills to favor sons and daughters equally,
and, seeing that the external environment has become more
favorable toward girls, choose to invest in their daughter’s
human capital by sending them to school.
There is suggestive cross-national evidence of such reinforc-
ing processes toward increased gender equality. Hallward-
Driemeier, Hasan, and Rusu (2013a) track the evolution of
key constraints to women’s and girls’ equal rights to property
and restrictions on their legal capacity over the past 50 years
across 100 countries using a database of legal indicators repre-
senting all geographic regions, legal traditions, and income
levels. The authors examine which country characteristics
and processes are associated with reforms, focusing on income
growth, education, patterns of employment, conﬂict, women’s
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the Convention to Eliminate Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), women’s age of ﬁrst marriage) and the strength
of the rule of law. Their results show that income does not nec-
essarily predict the adoption of anti-discriminatory reforms,
and that the ratiﬁcation of CEDAW and higher participation
of women in national parliaments are signiﬁcantly associated
with more reforms closing gender gaps in women’s economic
rights. While one could argue that countries with higher levels
of female education or higher female participation in the labor
force could be more likely to adopt CEDAW (that is, the rat-
iﬁcation of CEDAW is also endogenous to political processes
reﬂecting underlying gender norms), the positive associations
are remarkable. In another paper using the same 50-year legal
rights database, Hallward-Driemeier, Hasan, and Rusu
(2013b) ﬁnd that the elimination of gender gaps in the ability
to access and own property, sign legal documents in one’s own
name, and have equality or non-discrimination as a guiding
principle of the country’s constitution is associated with
greater participation of women in the labor force, greater
movement out of agricultural employment, higher rates of
women in wage employment, lower adolescent fertility, lower
maternal and infant mortality, and higher female educational
enrollment. Although causality cannot be established convinc-
ingly, these results suggest that reforms promoting gender
equality may have self-reinforcing and cumulative eﬀects.
(b) An overview of gender and property rights institutions in
Ethiopia 1
Ethiopia, the second most populous country in Africa, is
characterized by substantial ethnic and religious diversity,
with more than 85 ethnic groups and most major world reli-
gions represented, as well as animist belief systems (Webb,
von Braun, & Yohannes, 1992). This diversity extends beyond
the people and culture of Ethiopia to their environment, as the
agroecological zones and, consequently, farming systems vary
dramatically around the country. Diﬀerent religions, with
widely divergent views regarding matrimonial issues in gen-
eral, and the status of women in particular, are well repre-
sented and tend to dominate diﬀerent parts of the country –
the Orthodox church of Ethiopia in the north, Sunni Muslims
in the east and west, recently converted Protestants in the
south, and animist beliefs in parts of the south. This variation
is reﬂected in the diversity of gender norms, which tend to
favor men in property rights over assets (Fafchamps &
Quisumbing, 2002), with some noticeable regional patterns
that indicate that as one moves from north to south in Ethio-
pia, women’s status, and therefore possibly their bargaining
power, declines (e.g., Bevan & Pankhurst, 1996; Gopal &
Salim, 1999).
Norms regarding marriage and inheritance are important in
determining the relative control that men and women have
over productive and other assets. Marriage is a ﬂuid state in
Ethiopia; divorce is frequent and serial marriages are common
(Pankhurst, 1992). First marriages are likely to involve a bond
between households, rather than a personal arrangement by
the bride and groom (Pankhurst, 1992, p. 122). Analysis of
marital histories and assets brought to marriage ﬁnds that
on average men bring substantially more physical and human
capital to the marriage than do women (Fafchamps &
Quisumbing, 2002). 2 The great majority of the new couple’s
assets are brought to the marriage by the newlyweds them-
selves, with grooms bringing substantially more start-up capi-
tal than brides. Contrary to the preconception that marriage is
the time at which parents endow their oﬀspring with farmland,most of the land brought by grooms was already theirs prior
to marriage, because the state nominally owns the land and
assigns use rights (Gavian & Ehui, 1999).
Because marriage is a relatively ﬂuid state in rural Ethiopia,
customary practices surrounding marital dissolution also
aﬀect the wealth and relative bargaining power of men and
women. The literature on bargaining models of the household
(e.g., Lundberg & Pollack, 1994; Manser & Brown, 1980;
McElroy & Horney, 1981) also suggests that legal and custom-
ary dispositions regulating the disposition of assets upon
divorce aﬀect the gender distribution of welfare not only after
but also during marriage because the bargaining power of
married women is thought to depend on their exit option from
marriage. A study conducted prior to the passage of the Fam-
ily Law in 2000 (Fafchamps & Quisumbing, 2002) found that
half of the surveyed monogamous households expect the land
and house to go to the husband upon divorce; another 40%
expect them to be divided equally between husband and wife.
Regarding livestock, equal division between husband and wife
is the rule, irrespective of whether the livestock is owned
jointly or individually by the husband and the wife. Individu-
ally owned livestock, however, is more likely to be attributed
to its owner upon divorce. The situation in polygamous house-
holds is more male dominated in the sense that the husband is
much more likely to be given all assets upon divorce. Even
there, however, jointly owned livestock is expected to be
divided equally in most cases. In two-thirds of the cases,
respondents expect the wife to receive custody over young chil-
dren. Older children, in contrast, are expected either to follow
their father or to choose which parent they wish to live with.
The allocation of assets upon divorce varies considerably
depending on who is at fault (Fafchamps & Quisumbing,
2002). If it is the husband, the wife is slightly more likely to
be granted land and livestock, while if the wife is at fault, asset
distribution is dramatically changed in favor of the husband.
Even her own livestock is likely to go to her husband. Fault-
based divorce is punitive, and is particularly harsh for wives.
The concept of fault-based divorce is more prevalent in the
south-central region, especially among Protestants and Catho-
lics. Drunkenness, wife-beating, adultery, and failure to sup-
port one’s wife are most cited as husband faults that justify
divorce, while adultery, involvement in crime, disrespect, and
disposition of assets without consultation are the most com-
monly cited faults for wives.
Upon the death of the household head, assets are most likely
to go to the surviving spouse, together with child custody. The
devolution of livestock to the surviving spouse is essentially
unaﬀected by who owns it. Children inherit in less than half
the cases, and when they do, it is usually together with their
mother.
There are, however, sharp diﬀerences in customs across
locations, ethnic groups, and religions. Northern locations
are in general more generous toward women. There is system-
atic variation across ethnic or religious groups, but location-
speciﬁc norms are the best predictor of the disposition of
assets upon marital dissolution. Moreover, communities may
have their own ways of protecting women and other vulnera-
ble groups; local councils may also mediate the distribution of
assets should a dispute arise.
(c) Institutional change in gender and property rights
While progress toward gender equality has been slow in
Ethiopia, recent developments are promising. Prior to 2000,
legal reform had a limited impact on local traditions regarding
patrimonial issues. For example, although the 1960 Civil Code
POLICY REFORM TOWARD GENDER EQUALITY IN ETHIOPIA: LITTLE BY LITTLE THE EGG BEGINS TO WALK 409gave women more rights than their contemporaries in the Uni-
ted States or United Kingdom, it also maintained the tradition
of dispute settlement by personal arbitrators, normally older
men within the family or community selected by the dispu-
tants. The arbitrators, unfamiliar with or unsympathetic to
the new laws, continued to apply old customary laws. The
de jure system had nothing to do with the de facto reality that
existed for the next 30 years (Gopal, 2001). The major excep-
tion was the distribution and control of land, an area in which
the Ethiopian state has played a dominant role throughout the
centuries.
In 2000, however, the revised Family Code was passed, giv-
ing equal rights to spouses during the conclusion, duration,
and dissolution of marriage. It also required equal division
of all assets between the husband and wife upon divorce
(Federal Negarit Gazetta Extra Ordinary Issue, 2000). During
2000–05, Amhara, Oromiya, and Tigray implemented the code
(out of nine regions in Ethiopia), but as of 2011, all regions
now apply the revised Family Code (Hallward-Driemeier &
Gajigo, 2011). Hallward-Driemeier and Gajigo (2011) found
that women were relatively more likely to work in occupations
that require work outside the home, employ more educated
workers, and in paid and full-time jobs in areas where the
reform had been enacted, controlling for time and location
eﬀects. The relative increase in women’s participation in these
activities was 15–24% higher in areas where the reform was
carried out. Kumar and Quisumbing (2012), analyzing the
impact of changes in divorce laws following the reform of
the Family Code, ﬁnd that women who perceive that their hus-
bands will get custody of land or the house upon a divorce per-
ceive less control over their life and personal interests.
Children in households where women perceive they will get
less in a divorce settlement also do less well in school relative
to children of the same age; girls fare even worse than boys in
these households.
In 2003, the Ethiopian government also embarked on a pro-
cess of community-based land registration, which led to joint
certiﬁcation of husbands and wives, giving stronger land rights
to women. Property rights institutions governing land have
undergone drastic changes over the past four decades. Ethio-
pia’s land tenure system before 1975 was complex, with sub-
stantial regional variation, with the main forms being a
communal rist system in the North and a largely feudal system
that encouraged absentee landlordism in the South. 3 High
inequality of landownership contributed to the overthrow of
the imperial regime in 1975, after which the Marxist govern-
ment transferred ownership of all rural land to the state, estab-
lished peasant associations with wide judicial and
administrative powers at the village level, and promoted pro-
ducer cooperatives, villagization, and resettlement programs.
Following the overthrow of the Marxist regime in the early
1990s, intentions to move toward a system of private land
ownership did not fully materialize: the 1995 constitution
highlights that ownership of land is with the state and upholds
the right of every Ethiopian who wants to engage in agricul-
ture to receive inheritable use rights to a piece of land for free,
a principle that can be enforced through administrative reallo-
cation of land but that will likely conﬂict with the goal of
ensuring land users’ tenure security (Deininger et al., 2008,
p. 1789). As of 1997, user rights over land were being allocated
by Peasant Associations (PA), the local administrative unit in
rural areas, although many regions of the country had not
experienced land reallocations in recent years. The 1997 round
of the Ethiopian Rural Household survey found that, the land
user rights held by the surveyed households, two-thirds actu-
ally come directly from the PA (Fafchamps & Quisumbing,2002, Table 4), with land typically allocated to males prior
to marriage. Family was thus not the dominant source of land
for surveyed households. Women did, however, occasionally
receive land from the PA, thereby suggesting a political will-
ingness to depart from rural norms in the allocation of land
to women (Gopal & Salim, 1999).
A 1997 federal proclamation (law) devolved responsibility
for land policy to the regions, leading to high inter-regional
diversity of key legal provisions, similar to the way that the
reform of the Family Law was implemented. Reﬂecting this rel-
ative autonomy of regional land administration, a low-cost
land registration and certiﬁcation program was implemented
in 1998–99 in Tigray, the northernmost region, which provided
land certiﬁcates to more than 80% of the rural farm households
(Holden, Deininger, & Ghebru, 2007). The costs were low and
aﬀordable because local tools were used in demarcation and
measurement of plots, staﬀ with very limited training organized
the work, and strong local participation in the implementation
was required by the land administration. One-page certiﬁcates
were issued with the names of the heads of household (the hus-
band for married households), and details about the size, loca-
tion, and land quality of farm plots, as well as the names of the
neighbors for each plot. Female heads of household (widows,
divorced and single women) also received certiﬁcates in their
name for land in their possession. Thus, it can be argued that
the land registration strengthened the rights of female-headed
households, but not necessarily those of wives in male-headed
households. When the land registration was expanded to diﬀer-
ent regions, the land certiﬁcates included maps and, in some
regions, photos of the husband and wife (Deininger et al.,
2008), which made it more diﬃcult (than signatures) for hus-
bands to sell or rent out land without their wives’ consent, par-
ticularly in a society with very low literacy rates. The Ethiopian
land certiﬁcation scheme was noteworthy because land admin-
istration committees at the kebele level (the smallest adminis-
trative unit in Ethiopia) were required to have at least one
female member and land certiﬁcates were issued after public
registration for transparency (Deininger et al., 2008). Thus, it
appears that these eﬀorts to strengthen women’s land rights
are complementary to the changes instituted by the Family
Code, which gave equal rights to women and men in terms of
marriage, inheritance, and property. We investigate this com-
plementarity in the remainder of this paper.3. DATA AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTIVES
(a) Data
The ERHS is a panel dataset with seven rounds of data col-
lection. The data collection was coordinated by the Economics
Department at Addis Ababa University in collaboration with
the Centre for the Study of African Economies at Oxford Uni-
versity and the International Food Policy Research Institute.
This paper uses data from the 1997, 2004, and 2009 rounds.
The 1997 round contains baseline perceptions of the distribu-
tion of assets upon divorce prior to the reform of the Family
Code, while the 2004 and 2009 rounds were conducted a year
after and six years after the initiation of the land registration
eﬀort, respectively. Both authors were involved in the design
and analysis of the 1997, 2004, and 2009 rounds of the ERHS.
The ERHS sample consists of about 1,300 households in 15
villages across Ethiopia. 4 The ERHS was not designed to be
statistically representative of rural Ethiopia as a whole, 5 but
to represent major agroclimatic zones and farming systems.
While sample households within villages were randomly
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Figure 2. Proportion of female-headed households. Source: ERHS 2009.
410 WORLD DEVELOPMENTselected, the villages themselves were chosen to ensure that the
major farming systems are represented The ERHS also pro-
vides a wealth of longitudinal information on the same house-
holds and individuals, who were followed and reinterviewed
over 15 years. The location of the sample villages is shown
in Figure 1. About a third (32%) of sample households is
female-headed, based on self-reported headship, although
there is wide variation across the survey villages (Figure 2).
The highest rates of female-headship are found in the two
northern sites in Tigray (Haresaw and Geblen) and the lowest
is in Yetmen in the Amhara region. The rate of female-head-
ship is higher compared to data from the nationally represen-
tative Demographic and Health Survey 2011 which reports it
as 23.2%. This may be because by 2009, the ERHS households
had been followed for over a decade, and as a result the house-
holds are older, male heads of households may have died, with
their widows (who are typically much younger) taking their
place as household heads (also reﬂected in Table 1).
The surveys collected information on household demo-
graphic characteristics, occupation, cropping patterns, percep-
tions of poverty and well-being, experience with shocks, access
to credit, and so on. We present, in Table 1, some of the sum-
mary statistics for our sample, disaggregated by the sex of the
household head. We also present, wherever possible, the same
summary statistics from the DHS 2011 for comparison, also
disaggregated by sex of the household head. We disaggregate
by sex of household head for two reasons: (1) the relative dis-
advantage that female-headed households face owing to lower
land, assets, human capital, and social capital endowments; (2)
the higher vulnerability that female-headed households face to
covariate and idiosyncratic shocks. Given these reasons, there
is a distinct possibility that reform processes may have diﬀer-
ential eﬀects on male- and female-households.
Our previous work on Ethiopia (Kumar & Quisumbing,
2012), as well as data from the DHS, suggests that female-
headed households tend to be disadvantaged relative to
male-headed households on a number of dimensions. Female
heads are, on average, older and less educated than male
heads; female heads, on average, have no education, whereas
their male counterparts have at least two years of schooling.Figure 1. Location of the Ethiopian Rural HousehThe gender disparity in schooling is not limited to the educa-
tion of the head but is also true for the household at large: the
average highest education level within female-headed house-
holds is 4.76 years, which is about a year and half less than
that in male-headed households. Female-headed households
also tend to be smaller, with a larger fraction of female mem-
bers. Because household size is proportional to the amount of
labor resources the household controls in a rural area, and
because many farm operations (especially plowing) are inten-
sive in male labor, female-headed households tend to be disad-
vantaged with respect to labor endowments. 6
Female-headed households are also worse oﬀ compared to
their male counterparts in terms of land and asset ownership.
Male-headed households own 2.2 hectares of land, on average,
compared to 1.7 hectares for female-headed households. This
is true also for the DHS sample, however the diﬀerence in
amount of land owned is not that stark. Male-headed house-
holds also have an average of 9.4 tropical livestock units
(TLUs), which is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from female-headed
households’ holdings of 8.8 TLUs. Sixty percent of male-
headed households have at least some oxen, compared to
37% of female-headed households. In the DHS sample, house-
holds tend to hold fewer livestock units and the diﬀerence in
livestock ownership between male- and female-headed house-
holds is starker. Despite these diﬀerences in land and asset
ownership, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between in realold Survey (ERHS) villages. Source: ERHS.
Table 1. Comparison of household characteristics, by sex of household head, Ethiopia ERHS 2009 and DHS 2011
ERHS DHS 2011
Female-headed
household
Male-headed
household
p-Value Female-headed
household
Male-headed
household
p-Value
Age of head 54.28 52.53 ** 48.22 43.79 ***
Education of head 0.33 2.22 *** 0.66 1.89 ***
Highest grade obtained 4.76 6.28 *** 3.80 4.19 ***
Fraction of female members in household 0.62 0.47 *** 0.72 0.48 ***
Fraction of dependent members in household 0.51 0.52 0.58 0.52 ***
Household size 4.39 6.38 *** 3.61 5.30 ***
Total land owned, hectares 1.73 2.20 *** 2.33 2.72 ***
Total livestock owned, tropical livestock units 8.82 9.39 *** 2.79 4.26 ***
Fraction of households that own any oxen 0.37 0.61 *** n/a n/a
Real per capita consumption in 2004 (ETB, 1994 prices) 94.00 91.00 n/a n/a
Real per capita consumption in 2009 (ETB, 1994 prices) 59.00 60.00 n/a n/a
Fraction of households that are members of an iddir 0.76 0.89 *** n/a n/a
Network size 8.61 11.41 *** n/a n/a
Fraction of households that have a bank account 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.06 **
Number of sources from which a household can borrow 1.32 1.57 *** n/a n/a
Source: ERHS and authors’ computations.
Notes: *** and ** represent statistical signiﬁcance at 1% and 5%, respectively.
ETB = Ethiopian birr.
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households (Table 1).
Similar to the disparities in land and physical asset owner-
ship, there are also diﬀerences in measures of social capital,
namely network size and membership in an iddir (burial soci-
ety or funeral association). Network size refers to the number
of people that survey respondents say they can rely on in times
of need. Table 1 shows that male-headed households, on aver-
age, have larger networks, and that male-headed households
are more likely to be members of an iddir. In terms of access
to ﬁnancial institutions and credit, the proportion of house-
holds holding a bank account is quite small (about 5%) and
is not substantially diﬀerent for the two groups. However,
male-headed households have access to a greater number of
sources from which they can borrow.
Female-headed households also tend to be more vulnerable
to covariate and idiosyncratic shocks. Dercon, Hoddinott,
Krishnan, and Woldehanna (2012) ﬁnd that per capita con-
sumption in female-headed households is signiﬁcantly nega-
tively aﬀected by drought shocks (the impact on male-headed
households is insigniﬁcant), and in other work (Kumar &
Quisumbing, 2013) related to the 2007–08 global food price
increases, we ﬁnd that female-headed households are more
likely to report experiencing a reduction in asset holdings,
household income, or consumption due to high food prices.
Most relevant to this paper, Dercon et al. (2012) also ﬁnd that
per capita consumption in female-headed households is signif-
icantly lower following the death of a household head, spouse,
or another person in the household. Since the Family Law (to
be discussed below) protects women’s rights to property fol-
lowing marital dissolution, whether in cases of death or
divorce, this ﬁnding suggests that female-headed households
stand to beneﬁt from the additional protection oﬀered by these
legal reforms. Moreover, reforms that equalize men’s and
women’s property rights not only improve bargaining power
within a marital union but also secure access to assets beyond
the marriage (whether after the husband’s death or upon a
divorce). Therefore, such reforms are not only important for
women that are currently in a union, but also for those that
are not. Finally, our analysis of the land registration also exam-
ines diﬀerential participation and awareness of male- and
female-headed households because it is possible that the latterwere excluded from the process owing to their generally lower
social status or lack of information about the process itself.4. FAMILY LAW
In this section we use data from the 1997 and 2009 rounds of
the ERHS to assess changes in perceptions about the alloca-
tion of assets upon divorce.
In the 1997 and 2009 survey rounds, we asked female heads
(in female-headed households) or the spouses of male heads
(in male-headed households) a series of hypothetical questions
designed to elicit perceptions regarding the disposition of
assets and custody of younger and older children upon divorce
when (1) neither the husband nor the wife was at fault, (2) the
husband was at fault, or (3) the wife was at fault. The 1997
responses can be interpreted as baseline perceptions prior to
the reform of the Family Code, analyzed in Fafchamps and
Quisumbing (2002), while the 2009 responses are post-reform
perceptions. 7 Although divorce is common, it does not hap-
pen often enough to generate enough responses if we asked
about each respondent’s divorce experiences. Thus, our ques-
tions, which were about hypothetical situations, were dis-
cussed to obtain respondents’ perceptions of local norms
regarding divorce.
Figures 3–8 compare these responses of perceptions of asset
devolution for 1997 and 2009. Figure 3 shows the fraction of
spouse/female heads that perceived equal division of assets
and equal custody upon a no-fault divorce. In 1997 about
40% of the women perceived that land would be divided
equally between the husband and wife upon a no-fault divorce
and this percentage increased to more than 80% in 2009. We
observe similar patterns for the allocation of the house and
livestock. Figure 4 shows the percentage of women that per-
ceived that all of the assets would be given to the wife in case
of a no-fault divorce. A very small fraction of women per-
ceived that other assets would be given in their entirety to
the wife in case of a no-fault divorce and there are no signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerences across the two rounds. A very low proportion
of female heads/spouses believe that child custody wouldbe
shared equally in a no-fault divorce, even if this proportion
increased slightly during 1997–2009 (Figure 3). However, a
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Figure 3. Perceptions of allocation of assets and custody of children: Divided half-half in case of a no-fault divorce. Source: ERHS 2009.
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Figure 4. Perceptions of allocation of assets and custody of children: Given to the wife in case of a no-fault divorce. Source: ERHS 2009.
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Figure 5. Perceptions of allocation of assets and custody of children: Divided half-half in case of divorce when wife is at fault. Source: ERHS 2009.
0.00
0.20
0.40
0.60
0.80
1.00
Young
children
Older
children
Land House Livestock
from
husband
Livestock
from wife
Livestock
acquired
aer
marriage
HH
Utensils
1997
2009
Figure 6. Perceptions of allocation of assets and custody of children: Given to the husband in case of divorce when wife is at fault. Source: ERHS 2009.
412 WORLD DEVELOPMENTlarge proportion believes that custody of younger children
remains with the wife, and this increased substantially between
the two rounds (Figure 4).The next two ﬁgures show women’s perceptions of allocation
of assets in case of a divorce when the wife is at fault. Figure 5
shows the percentage of women that perceived that assets would
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Figure 7. Perceptions of allocation of assets and custody of children: Divided half-half in case of divorce when husband is at fault. Source: ERHS 2009.
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Figure 8. Perceptions of allocation of assets and custody of children: Given to the wife in case of divorce when husband is at fault. Source: ERHS 2009.
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In 1997, the fraction of women that perceived equal division of
assets in such a scenario is quite small with the exception of live-
stock acquired after marriage and household utensils. This,
however, changes dramatically in 2009 where close to 30% of
women perceive equal division of a number of assets. Figure 6
presents the corresponding fraction of women who perceived
that the assets would be given to the husband in case of a divorce
when the wife is at fault. As expected, in 1997 a large fraction of
women perceived that most assets would be given to the hus-
band in such a situation but again these percentages have
decreased drastically in 2009. While there is a slight increase
in those who believe that custody of children would be shared
equally (Figure 5), in most cases where the wife is at fault, there
is a slight increase in those believing the husband would have
custody of the younger children, while there is a decrease the
proportion of those who think the husbandwould have custody
of the older children. The last set of ﬁgures shows women’s per-
ceptions regarding the allocation of assets upon a divorce when
the husband is at fault. Formost asset categories, in 1997 a large
fraction of women perceived that the asset would be divided
equally between the husband and the wife in case of a divorce
when the husband is at fault (Figure 7). These percentages are
greater than the corresponding ones for a divorce that occurs
when the wife is at fault. Interestingly, these women do not nec-
essarily perceive that the assets would be given to the wife when
the husband is at fault in 1997, although these perceptions
change a little in favor of women in 2009 (Figure 8). Respon-
dents believe, however, that the wife would have custody of chil-
dren when the husband is at fault, with the proportion of those
holding this belief increasing markedly in 2009.
These above-mentionedﬁgures clearly show that regardless of
who is at fault when a divorce occurs, there is a shift in percep-
tions toward splitting property evenly between the husband andthe wife, with the exception of children, who are perceived to
stay with the wife. This change, probably driven by the changes
in the Family Law that occurred in 2000, tends to be observed
throughout the sample, albeit with some regional variation.
We construct a variable that indicates whether female-house-
hold heads/spouses in male-headed households perceived that
allocations of land and livestock acquired after marriage
shifted toward equal allocations across spouses in case of a
no-fault divorce (Table 2). On average, a large fraction of
households (44% and 35%, respectively) moved toward per-
ceiving a more equal distribution of land and livestock in case
of a no-fault divorce, although there is substantial regional var-
iation. In Tigray, the fraction of households that moved
toward perceiving a more equal distribution of assets is rela-
tively small, about 14%, primarily because initial conditions
were already more egalitarian. In 1997, local norms regarding
the distribution of assets after divorce were already more equal
in Tigray, with about 40% of households perceiving that land is
allocated equally between the couple upon a no-fault divorce.
On the other end of the spectrum lies SNNPR, where almost
two-thirds of the households changed their response to reﬂect
perceptions of more equal allocation. This is also due to initial
conditions: a very small proportion of households reported
perceptions of equal division in 1997. These statistics show that
not only did the greatest shifts in perceptions toward more
equal allocations occur in the regions where the distribution
was most unequal, but improvement was perceived even in
the regions with relatively gender-fair post-divorce allocations.
We examine whether individual and household characteris-
tics aﬀect changes in perceptions regarding the allocation of
land and livestock upon divorce using regression analysis.
Because perceptions are subjective, they may be inﬂuenced by
individual and household characteristics; persons from wealth-
ier households, for example, may have more to lose if a
Table 2. Summary statistics: Changes in perceptions regarding allocation of land and livestock upon divorce, 1997–2009
Percentage of households whose perceptions shifted toward All Female-headed
household
Male-headed
household
Equal allocation of land upon a no-fault divorce 44 40 46
Equal allocation of livestock acquired after marriage upon a no-fault divorce 35 34 36
Tigray
Equal allocation of land upon a no-fault divorce 13 17 7
Equal allocation of livestock acquired after marriage upon a no-fault divorce 14 18 9
Amhara
Equal allocation of land upon a no-fault divorce 30 33 28
Moved toward equal allocation of livestock acquired after marriage upon a no-fault divorce 21 24 20
Oromiya
Equal allocation of land upon a no-fault divorce 52 48 54
Equal allocation of livestock acquired after marriage upon a no-fault divorce 35 33 36
SNNPR
Equal allocation of land upon a no-fault divorce 62 54 66
Equal allocation of livestock acquired after marriage upon a no-fault divorce 58 61 57
Source: ERHS and authors’ computation.
Table 3. Regression results for changes in perceptions regarding allocation of land and livestock upon divorce
Variables Moved to split land half-half Moved to split livestock half-half
All Male-headed
household
Female-headed
household
All Male-headed
household
Female-headed
household
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age of household head 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Sex of household head (1 = male, 0 = female) 0.041 0.048
(0.049) (0.048)
Number of years of schooling of the head 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.004 0.011* 0.009 0.015
(0.007) (0.008) (0.023) (0.007) (0.007) (0.022)
Highest grade obtained in household 0.011* 0.012 0.008 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.015
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.007) (0.010)
Total plot area in hectares, 2004 survey 0.019* 0.025** 0.003 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.010
(0.010) (0.011) (0.027) (0.009) (0.009) (0.028)
Fraction of total land that is good or medium quality 0.112** 0.136* 0.087 0.150*** 0.198*** 0.109
(0.057) (0.074) (0.090) (0.054) (0.066) (0.089)
Dummy for land quartile 1, 2004 survey 0.001 0.075 0.141 0.022 0.027 0.061
(0.047) (0.057) (0.093) (0.045) (0.055) (0.090)
Dummy for land quartile 2, 2004 survey 0.035 0.011 0.118 0.051 0.055 0.037
(0.047) (0.055) (0.098) (0.045) (0.051) (0.096)
Dummy for land quartile 3, 2004 survey 0.008 0.029 0.014 0.012 0.001 0.028
(0.045) (0.051) (0.101) (0.042) (0.046) (0.095)
Total livestock holdings, 2004 survey (tropical livestock units) 0.012** 0.011* 0.020* 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.028***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
Member of an iddir, 2004 survey 0.134*** 0.131** 0.109 0.090** 0.056 0.079
(0.043) (0.057) (0.072) (0.042) (0.054) (0.070)
Network size, 2004 survey 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Observations 972 659 313 966 660 306
R-squared 0.072 0.087 0.082 0.088 0.136 0.087
Source: ERHS and authors’ computation.
Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The number of observations in columns (1) and (4) represents the
sample for which we have all set of covariates and outcome variables. The number of observations in columns (2) (3) and (5) (6) represents the male-
(female-) headed households in the sample.
414 WORLD DEVELOPMENTpost-divorce allocation was not in their favor. Alternatively,
individuals controlling more assets within the marriage may
perceive (perhaps wishfully) that the divorce allocations post-
reform would still favor them. Table 3 presents regressions
on (a) whether the female head/spouse’s perception regarding
the distribution of land after a divorce shifted toward equaldivision and (b) whether her perception regarding the distribu-
tion of livestock after a divorce shifted toward equal division,
as a function of the sex and age of the head, the number of
years of schooling of the head, the highest grade obtained in
the household, the fraction of good quality land, plot area in
2004, a dummy for relative wealth in the village (as measured
Table 4. Regression results for changes in perceptions regarding allocation of land and livestock upon divorce with village ﬁxed eﬀects
Variables Moved to split land half-half Moved to split livestock half-half
All Male-headed
household
Female-headed
household
All Male-headed
household
Female-headed
household
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age of household head 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Sex of household head (1 = male, 0 = female) 0.050 0.018
(0.047) (0.044)
Number of years of schooling of the head 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.024
(0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.006) (0.007) (0.020)
Highest grade obtained in household 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Total plot area in hectares, 2004 survey 0.044*** 0.035*** 0.092*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.031
(0.010) (0.010) (0.033) (0.009) (0.009) (0.035)
Fraction of total land that is good or medium quality 0.002 0.026 0.029 0.017 0.028 0.039
(0.054) (0.071) (0.089) (0.055) (0.072) (0.083)
Dummy for land quartile 1, 2004 survey 0.034 0.004 0.171** 0.008 0.019 0.025
(0.042) (0.052) (0.086) (0.041) (0.051) (0.084)
Dummy for land quartile 2, 2004 survey 0.033 0.031 0.071 0.003 0.021 0.063
(0.043) (0.051) (0.092) (0.040) (0.044) (0.090)
Dummy for land quartile 3, 2004 survey 0.015 0.026 0.007 0.020 0.022 0.006
(0.040) (0.045) (0.094) (0.037) (0.043) (0.085)
Total livestock holdings, 2004 survey (tropical livestock units) 0.002 0.005 0.016 0.000 0.007 0.016*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Member of an iddir, 2004 survey 0.123* 0.129 0.150 0.170*** 0.259*** 0.111
(0.069) (0.093) (0.115) (0.064) (0.084) (0.107)
Network size, 2004 survey 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Observations 972 659 313 966 660 306
R-squared 0.243 0.287 0.233 0.283 0.318 0.338
Source: ERHS and authors’ computation.
Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The number of observations in columns (1) and (4) represents the
sample for which we have all set of covariates and outcome variables. The number of observations in columns (2) (3) and (5) (6) represents the male-
(female-) headed households in the sample.
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with quartile 1 being the lowest 25%), total livestock holdings
in 2004, whether the household belonged to an iddir in 2004,
and network size in 2004. We use 2004 values to control for
the possibility that 2009 household characteristics may be
codetermined by factors aﬀecting perceptions regarding
divorce distributions. The regressions are estimated separately
for currently married females (spouses in male-headed house-
holds) and female-headed households; it is possible that actual
experiences of divorce or marital dissolution could create dif-
ferences between responses of currently and previously married
women. Regression results (Table 3) show that among wives in
male-headed households, those with large quantities of land or
livestock are less likely to have changed their perceptions
regarding whether or not land or livestock will be equally allo-
cated after divorce. This suggests that households in which the
husbands have more at stake are less likely to report having
shifted their perceptions toward equal division upon divorce.
This variable is not signiﬁcant for female-headed households
in the case of land, but is signiﬁcant in the case of livestock.
Female-headed households that own more land are less likely
to have experienced a shift in perceptions toward equal division
of livestock upon divorce. It is possible that wealthier males,
precisely because they have more wealth to lose, will resist
eﬀorts to achieve greater equality between ex-spouses after
divorce.
Are these results robust to the inclusion of village ﬁxed
eﬀects that may capture unobserved, time-invariant social
norms regarding the division of property upon divorce? 8 Totest this, we add village ﬁxed eﬀects (Table 4) to the regres-
sions. Although some results change, some key results remain.
Having larger areas of land still reduces the probability that
perceptions of the spouses of male heads and female heads will
shift toward equal division of land and livestock upon divorce,
but the impact of landholdings on the perceptions of female-
headed households regarding the division of livestock is no
longer signiﬁcant. Neither do livestock holdings inﬂuence per-
ceptions regarding the division of land or livestock after mar-
ital dissolution when village ﬁxed eﬀects are included. This
shows that within-village variation in land area owned by
female-headed households and livestock ownership in general
is driving the results as opposed to variation across villages.
We do, however, observe that membership in an iddir reduces
the probability that the perceptions regarding the division of
land or livestock after a divorce shift toward equal division.
Because iddirs are traditional risk-sharing institutions, it is
possible that they subscribe to traditional norms that may
dampen the eﬀect of reforms, although this remains a topic
to be investigated further.5. THE LAND REGISTRATION PROCESS
In this section we use data from ERHS 2009 to examine
whether male- and female-headed households diﬀer in terms
of land owned and cultivated, and whether male or female
household heads diﬀer in their awareness of and participation
in the land registration process. In 2009 we interviewed all
Table 5. Characteristics of land owned and cropped
Female-headed household Male-headed household p-Value
Total plot area, hectares 1.60 2.00 **
Total cropped area, hectares 1.19 1.69 ***
Fraction of total land that is cropped 0.71 0.85 ***
Fraction of cropped land that is good or medium quality 0.83 0.89 ***
Fraction of total land that is good or medium quality 0.83 0.88 ***
Fraction of cropped area operated by women 0.82 0.01 ***
Fraction of plot area operated by women 0.84 0.01 ***
Fraction of cropped area registered 0.95 0.97 **
Fraction of total land area registered 0.96 0.97 *
Source: ERHS and authors’ computations.
Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
416 WORLD DEVELOPMENTheads of households on their awareness, participation and per-
ceptions of the land registration process. Table 5 indicates that
male-headed households hold more land (have larger plot
sizes), of which a larger proportion is cultivable, compared
with female-headed households. The larger areas and propor-
tions of land cultivated may be partly because of better land
quality and the fact that larger plot sizes are more viable for
cultivation. Women in male-headed households are very rarely
in charge of operating land, but the converse cannot be said
for female-headed households, where about one-ﬁfth of the
time men are operating the land. 9 This may occur due to cul-
tural norms that prohibit women from plowing land because it
is perceived to be too strenuous or culturally inappropriate
(Frank, 1999). Male-headed households are also more likely
to have a larger fraction of their land registered.
Next, we explore the diﬀerences in awareness, participation,
and perception of the land registration process between the
two types of households, for the entire sample and separately
by region (Table 6). In Tigray, only about 3% of the household
heads in our sample reported any awareness about the land
registration process; therefore, we do not have useful estimates
of participation by these households. 10
Male heads of households were much more likely to have
heard of the land registration process. Almost all male house-
hold heads (90%) had heard of the process, compared to about
three-quarters of female heads. There is, however, some regio-
nal variation. In Oromiya, female household heads were just
as likely as the male heads to have heard about the process.
We ﬁnd that, throughout our survey villages, male household
heads were more aware of public information meetings held
before the land registration process, were more likely to have
attended such meetings (as well as a greater number of meet-
ings), and were more likely to have received some written
material about the program.
Most household heads acknowledged that their plot bound-
aries were well demarcated before the land registration process
started, and about a quarter to a third of the households
reported facing land disputes before the registration process.
They perceive the land title as a protection against encroach-
ment and agree that the number of land disputes decreased
after the land registration process was complete. In Oromiya,
household heads do not value the title so much as a means of
protection against encroachment (42–48%, compared to the
sample average of 62–65%), probably because their plot
boundaries were clearly demarcated even before the process
was implemented. All household heads, regardless of sex,
believe that the title increases their incentive for planting trees
(more so for male heads) and increases the probability of
receiving compensation in case of appropriation. Both male
and female household heads also believe that having a landcertiﬁcate improves the position of women. All in all, the data
in Table 6 suggest that most household heads perceive the land
registration process as valuable.
The major diﬀerence between male- and female heads of
households lies in their knowledge of and participation in
the program. We use information on the awareness of the
land registration process, about public meetings held before
the registration process started, whether household members
attended these meetings, the number of meeting attended
and if they received any written materials on the process
to construct an index of participation that ranges from 0
to 5, where 0 represents no awareness or participation and
5 represents a high level of awareness and participation.
This is presented graphically in Figure 9 for the entire sam-
ple and then for each region, disaggregated by the sex of the
household head. This shows that male-headed households
on average have a higher index of participation compared
to female-headed households. This disparity is most striking
in SNNPR.
We estimate alternative regression models that examine the
determinants of awareness about the land registration process,
participation in the process by way of attending meetings, and
the index of participation in the land registration process, with
lagged household characteristics as regressors, as well as a var-
iable indicating the presence of female members in the Land
Administration Committee (LAC). 11 We estimate the regres-
sions for awareness of and participation in the land registration
process as linear probability models and the regressions for
index of participation as an ordered logit model. Household
characteristics, such as sex of the household head, education
levels, size and quality of land, and relative wealth within the
community, can aﬀect the household’s extent of awareness
and participation in the land registration program. These char-
acteristics include the age and sex of the household head, years
of schooling of the head and the highest grade obtained in the
household, area and quality of land, asset holdings, networks,
iddirmembership, access to credit, and relative wealth in the vil-
lage (as measured by the dummy variables for land quartiles
within the village, with quartile 1 being the lowest 25%). With
the exception of household demographic characteristics, which
refer to the current round, we use lagged household characteris-
tics because current household characteristics (for example,
asset holdings) could be correlatedwith participation in the land
registration eﬀort. We also include two categorical variables
that capture the respondent’s perception regarding his or her
power to change the course of his or her life. This variable is sim-
ilar to those included in surveys like the Gallup World Poll and
World Values Survey (for details see http://www.gallupworld-
poll.com/content/24046/About.aspx and http://www.world-
valuessurvey.org/index_html). While the power to change
Table 6. Land registration process: Knowledge and participation
Whole sample Amhara Oromiya SNNPR
Female-headed
household
Male-headed
household
p-value Female-headed
household
Male-headed
household
p-value Female-headed
household
Male-headed
household
p-value Female-headed
household
Male- headed
household
p-value
Are aware of the land
registration process
0.75 0.9 *** 0.9 0.96 *** 0.96 0.96 0.83 0.95 ***
Public information meetings were
held before the land registration
program started
0.79 0.91 *** 0.83 0.91 ** 0.74 0.9 *** 0.86 0.93 *
Any member of the household
attended any of these meetings
0.81 0.89 *** 0.83 0.87 ** 0.8 0.9 ** 0.83 0.91 *
Number of these meetings
attended
2.19 2.71 *** 2.28 2.74 2.07 2.66 ** 2.3 2.79 **
Received any written material on
this program
0.15 0.22 *** 0.17 0.18 ** 0.03 0.08 ** 0.3 0.47 ***
The plot borders were clearly
demarcated before the land
registration
0.88 0.88 0.84 0.82 0.92 0.94 0.89 0.86
Faced border disputes before the
land registration
0.28 0.26 0.31 0.22 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.28
The plot borders were clearly
demarcated during the land
registration
0.97 0.96 0.96 0.93 * 0.96 0.97 0.99 0.96 *
The land registration reduced the
number of border disputes
during the process
0.39 0.38 0.42 0.41 * 0.27 0.24 0.55 0.56
The land registration reduced the
number of border disputes after
the process was completed
0.39 0.39 0.45 0.42 0.26 0.25 0.49 0.54
Having a certiﬁcate protects
against encroachment on land by
neighbors
0.62 0.65 0.8 0.8 0.42 0.48 0.72 0.76
Need for a new land demarcation
to make borders clearer
0.35 0.37 0.32 0.44 0.3 0.3 0.46 0.41
Have suﬃcient witnesses that can
conﬁrm the borders of their plots
in case it was contested
0.94 0.92 0.93 0.91 ** 0.92 0.9 0.98 0.94 **
Interested in planting trees on
any of their plots
0.77 0.81 0.81 0.86 0.7 0.73 0.83 0.87
Having the land certiﬁcate
increases their incentive to plant
trees
0.74 0.81 *** 0.79 0.85 0.65 0.74 ** 0.83 0.87
Having a certiﬁcate will increase
the possibility of obtaining
compensation in case land is
appropriated
0.92 0.92 0.93 0.9 0.95 0.92 0.87 0.94 *
Having a land certiﬁcate
improves the position of women
0.94 0.95 0.98 0.99 0.9 0.93 0.97 0.94
Source: ERHS and authors’ computations.
Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
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Table 7. Regression results for knowledge and participatio
Variables
Knowledge Att
(1)
Age of household head 0.001 
(0.001) (0
Gender of household head (1 = male, 0 = female) 0.034 0
(0.023) (0
Number of years of schooling of the head 0.001 
(0.004) (0
Highest grade obtained in household 0.004 0.
(0.003) (0
Total plot area in hectares, 2004 survey 0.008 
(0.007) (0
Fraction of total land that is good or medium quality 0.032 0
(0.031) (0
Total livestock holdings, 2004 survey (tropical livestock
units)
0.001 
(0.002) (0
Dummy for land quartile 1, 2004 survey 0.011 
(0.021) (0
Dummy for land quartile 2, 2004 survey 0.007 
(0.020) (0
Dummy for land quartile 3, 2004 survey 0.022 
(0.018) (0
Presence of female members in the LAC 0.912*** 0
(0.036) (0
Household head perceives to have some power to change
the course of his/her life
0.021 0
(0.032) (0
Household head perceives to have a lot of power to
change the course of his/her life
0.039 0
(0.031) (0
Member of an iddir, 2004 survey 0.062* 0
(0.038) (0
Network size, 2004 survey 0.000 
(0.000) (0
Household member has a bank account 0.023 0
(0.039) (0
Observations 1,062
R-squared 0.675 0
Source: ERHS 2009 and authors’ computation.
Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respe
for which we have all set of covariates and outcome variables. Column 2 has
attendance—is deﬁned conditional on knowledge. The number of observatio
households in the sample.
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Whole
Sample
Tigray Amhara Oromiya SNNPR
Female
Headed
Male
Headed
Figure 9. Index of participation in land registration process. Source: ERHS
418 WORLD DEVELOPMENTone’s life could potentially be aﬀected by theFamilyLaw reform
(and therefore be endogenously determined), our previous work
(Kumar & Quisumbing, 2012) suggests that changes in percep-
tions of divorce distributions do not aﬀect respondents’ percep-
tions of their ability to change the course of their lives, justifying
its inclusion in this regression. We run this regression with and
without village ﬁxed eﬀects to control for unobserved village-
level characteristics.
The regressions reported in Table 7 were run for the pooled
sample with a dummy for the sex of the household head, but
this variable was not signiﬁcant. The regression estimates,
show that, on average, membership in an iddir and the presence
of female members in the LAC increases knowledge of and
attendance at meetings during the land registration process.
This is reasonable because the iddir is a type of social network
that facilitates information-sharing in addition to its insurance
objectives. The presence of female members in the LAC mayn in land registration process with village ﬁxed eﬀects
All Male-headed household Female-headed
household
endance Index Knowledge Attendance Knowledge Attendance
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.001 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000
.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
.020 0.296
.040) (0.191)
0.000 0.016 0.001 0.004 0.010 0.018
.005) (0.031) (0.003) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
012*** 0.021 0.005* 0.009* 0.004 0.019*
.004) (0.024) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011)
0.004 0.068 0.004 0.007 0.009* 0.027
.011) (0.043) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.043)
.047 0.063 0.039 0.049 0.048 0.011
.057) (0.298) (0.041) (0.064) (0.043) (0.133)
0.004 0.017 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.023*
.005) (0.021) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012)
0.070* 0.696*** 0.007 0.049 0.057 0.144*
.038) (0.196) (0.022) (0.045) (0.059) (0.083)
0.038 0.183 0.003 0.049 0.016 0.084
.034) (0.191) (0.019) (0.040) (0.057) (0.074)
0.062* 0.255 0.010 0.028 0.021 0.260***
.032) (0.179) (0.019) (0.035) (0.054) (0.087)
.469* 6.090*** 0.933*** 0.179 0.911*** 1.066***
.262) (0.668) (0.048) (0.379) (0.064) (0.184)
.104** 0.276 0.056 0.085 0.057 0.161*
.051) (0.224) (0.040) (0.064) (0.044) (0.084)
.057 0.247 0.060 0.033 0.000 0.142*
.052) (0.223) (0.040) (0.065) (0.039) (0.083)
.071 0.610** 0.045 0.047 0.031 0.208
.071) (0.256) (0.043) (0.082) (0.054) (0.159)
0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000
.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.006)
.008 0.312 0.005 0.038 0.039 0.007
.056) (0.383) (0.043) (0.068) (0.070) (0.129)
793 1,064 737 602 325 191
.127 0.650 0.115 0.748 0.342
ctively. The number of observations in columns 1–3 represents the sample
fewer observations than columns 1 and 3 because the outcome variable—
ns in columns (4) (6) and (5) (7) represents the male- (female-) headed
Table 8. Comparing characteristics of villages with Land Administrative Committees with and without women members
No women in LAC Women in LAC p-value
Average age of household head, 2009 53.05 54.02 0.60
Fraction of male headed households, 2009 0.76 0.66 0.08*
Average years of schooling of head, 2004 1.85 1.55 0.61
Average of highest grade obtained in household, 2004 6.08 6.76 0.35
Average household size, 2009 6.42 6.24 0.62
Average land area owned, 2004 2.19 0.97 0.02**
Real per capita consumption in 2004 (ETB, 1994 prices) 97.57 81.63 0.45
Average fraction of land that is of good quality, 2009 0.90 0.75 0.04**
Average fraction of land registered, 2009 0.96 0.95 0.57
Average livestock holdings, tropical livestock units, 2004 4.38 2.47 0.10*
Fraction of heads that perceive to have some power to change the course of their life, 2009 0.33 0.31 0.71
Fraction of heads that perceive to have a lot power to change the course of their life, 2009 0.56 0.65 0.12
Average fraction of households that are member of iddirs, 2004 0.9 0.64 0.11
Average network size, 2004 9.1 6.66 0.17
Average fraction of households that have a bank account, 2004 0.04 0.06 0.47
No. of villages 12 6
Source: ERHS 2009 and authors’ computation.
Notes: ** and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at 5% and 1%, respectively.
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comfortable accessing, and also improves their participation.
Surprisingly, households with higher schooling levels are less
likely to know of the land registration process, possibly because
these households may be less likely to be intensively involved in
agriculture. Being in the top land quartile makes the household
more likely to have attended a meeting during the land registra-
tion process compared to those in the third quartile. These
households, by deﬁnition, own a larger amount of land and
have more to gain out of attending such meetings. Household
heads who think they have some power to change their circum-
stances are more likely to attend these meetings compared to
those who think they have no control over circumstances. This
is an interesting ﬁnding suggesting that individuals that feel
they have no control over their circumstances do not ﬁnd it use-
ful to attend the meetings – these individuals probably do not
perceive much beneﬁt from such changes in tenure security.
The index is higher for households that live in villages with
at least one female member in the LAC, are members of an
iddir, and are in the top land quartile within the village.
The coeﬃcients on interaction terms when we run a model
(not reported) with all covariates interacted with the sex of
the household head are jointly signiﬁcant, indicating that the
impact of these variables varies by sex of the household head
for the awareness and participation in the land registration
process. For ease of exposition and interpretation, we estimate
the regressions separately for male-and female-headed house-
holds (reported in Table 7).
In terms of knowledge of the land registration process, the
characteristics that diﬀer across male- and female-headed
households are highest grade obtained in the household and
total plot area. For male-headed households, education has
a negative eﬀect, whereas this eﬀect is positive (although not
signiﬁcant) among the female-headed households. Also,
female-headed households with smaller amounts of land are
more likely to have heard about the land registration process,
which is not the case among the male-headed households. This
interesting distinction between male- and female-headed
households indicates that the more vulnerable female-headed
households who cultivate small land holdings are more likely
to have heard of the land registration process. For the atten-
dance regressions, the main diﬀerence comes from total live-
stock holdings, being in the third land quartile in the village,
and presence of female members in the LAC. Female house-hold heads with large livestock holdings (and in the third land
quartile) are less likely (than those in the fourth quartile) to
have attended a meeting. Heads from households with larger
livestock holdings are less likely to attend meetings because
of the high opportunity cost of livestock cultivation, which
tends to be labor-intensive, and because these households
are more diversiﬁed into livestock products. An interesting
ﬁnding is that the presence of female members in the LAC
encourages participation by female-headed households and
does not appear to discourage participation by male-headed
households. This indicates that having female members in
the LAC has a net positive impact on attendance at meetings
relating to land registration.
Are there systematic diﬀerences between villages that have
women members on their LACs and those from villages that
do not? Summary statistics presented in Table 8 show that vil-
lages that have women members on their LAC have also on
average a greater fraction of households headed by women,
with smaller plots of land, and fewer livestock units. In partic-
ular, average household land holding in villages that do not
have women in their LAC is more than double as compared
to that in villages that have women members in the LAC
and the former are also more likely to have better quality land.
This shows that women tend to be present in LACs in rela-
tively poorer communities with higher prevalence of female-
headship, and smaller and poorer quality landholdings.
Do policy reforms reinforce each other? Table 9 presents
regressions on the change in perceptions regarding distribution
of land and livestock upon divorce, with additional variables
that capture the land reform registration eﬀort as regressors. 12
This is an augmented version of the regressions presented in
Table 3, which attempts to test whether the land registration
eﬀort has an incremental impact on divorce perceptions. Con-
trolling for all previously included regressors, we ﬁnd that
awareness about the land registration process is positively cor-
related with the shift in perceptions toward equal division of
land and livestock upon divorce, especially for male-headed
households, suggesting that interventions can reinforce each
other. Having at least one female member in the LAC also
is positively correlated with the shift in perception toward
equal allocation of land among female-headed households
and livestock allocation for all samples. It is possible that
the positive impact of women in the LAC reﬂects village char-
acteristics associated with having a female LAC member in the
Table 9. Regression results for changes in perceptions regarding allocation of land and livestock upon divorce
Variables Moved to split land half-half Moved to split livestock half-half
All Male-headed
household
Female-headed
household
All Male-headed
household
Female-headed
household
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age of household head 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Sex of household head (1 = male, 0 = female) 0.030 0.058
(0.048) (0.046)
Number of years of schooling of the head 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.011
(0.007) (0.008) (0.022) (0.006) (0.007) (0.023)
Highest grade obtained in household 0.007 0.009 0.001 0.007 0.009 0.000
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Total plot area in hectares, 2004 survey 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.025 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.063**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.029) (0.011) (0.012) (0.031)
Fraction of total land that is good or medium quality 0.044 0.062 0.044 0.037 0.087 0.016
(0.057) (0.074) (0.091) (0.054) (0.068) (0.086)
Dummy for land quartile 1, 2004 survey 0.015 0.058 0.173* 0.048 0.005 0.114
(0.047) (0.056) (0.094) (0.043) (0.053) (0.087)
Dummy for land quartile 2, 2004 survey 0.040 0.017 0.132 0.060 0.064 0.065
(0.046) (0.054) (0.099) (0.042) (0.048) (0.094)
Dummy for land quartile 3, 2004 survey 0.017 0.028 0.012 0.001 0.002 0.014
(0.045) (0.050) (0.102) (0.040) (0.045) (0.092)
Total livestock holdings, 2004 survey (tropical livestock units) 0.013** 0.012* 0.022** 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.029***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010)
Presence of female members in the LAC 0.081** 0.038 0.214*** 0.301*** 0.262*** 0.375***
(0.041) (0.048) (0.079) (0.035) (0.042) (0.069)
Member of an iddir, 2004 survey 0.011 0.021 0.043 0.059 0.072 0.063
(0.053) (0.069) (0.089) (0.049) (0.062) (0.079)
Network size, 2004 survey 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006)
Aware of the land registration process 0.203*** 0.329*** 0.020 0.123** 0.168** 0.014
(0.060) (0.079) (0.099) (0.051) (0.066) (0.081)
Observations 970 657 313 964 658 306
R-squared 0.094 0.117 0.108 0.166 0.198 0.173
Source: ERHS and authors’ computation.
Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The number of observations in columns (1) and (4) represents the
sample for which we have all set of covariates and outcome variables. The number of observations in columns (2) (3) and (5) (6) represents the male-
(female-) headed households in the sample.
420 WORLD DEVELOPMENTﬁrst place. However, when we include village ﬁxed eﬀects
(Table 10), we ﬁnd that the positive impact of the presence
of females in the LAC on shifting perceptions toward an equal
split in both land and livestock for both male- and female-
headed households is robust to the inclusion of village ﬁxed
eﬀects. This indicates that, even controlling for local norms
regarding the distribution of assets upon divorce, as well as
the relatively poor local environments of villages with females
on the LAC, the presence of females in an important village-
level committee may provide support to women who are
asserting their legal rights, whether in the area of land registra-
tion or in divorce negotiations. 13 This suggests that increasing
women’s representation in village committees may have spill-
over eﬀects that lead to improvements in gender equality.
Moreover, since females tend to be on the LAC in poorer vil-
lages, the signiﬁcance of this variable indicates that female
LAC members may have a pro-poor eﬀect on the land regis-
tration process.6. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Drawing on North’s theory of institutional change, we use
data from rural Ethiopia to show how the changes in theFamily Code implemented in 2000 and the community-based
land registration, undertaken since 2003 may have created con-
ditions for self-reinforcing reforms that favor gender equity.
Ethiopia’s land registration process increased tenure secu-
rity among women, and, if properly implemented, has the
potential for far-reaching impacts. Similar to previous studies,
however, our analysis ﬁnds gender gaps in awareness and
information about the process. In particular, male-headed
households are, on average, more likely to have heard about
the land registration process, to have attended meetings (and
a greater number of meetings), and to have received some writ-
ten material with information about the process. A notewor-
thy ﬁnding is that the presence of female members in the
LAC encourages participation by female-headed households,
who are more likely to be excluded by the process, but does
not discourage participation by male-headed households.
Although the reform of Family Code occurred a few years
before the beginning of the land reform eﬀort, our analysis
ﬁnds additional impacts of the land registration eﬀort on the
evolution of perceptions of the distribution of assets upon
divorce. We ﬁnd that awareness about the land registration
process is positively correlated with the shift in perceptions
toward equal division of land and livestock upon divorce, par-
ticularly for wives in male-headed households. The presence of
Table 10. Regression results for changes in perceptions regarding allocation of land and livestock upon divorce with village ﬁxed eﬀects
Variables Moved to split land half-half Moved to split livestock half-half
All Male-headed
household
Female-headed
household
All Male-headed
household
Female-headed
household
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age of household head 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Sex of household head (1 = male, 0 = female) 0.048 0.016
(0.047) (0.043)
Number of years of schooling of the head 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.024
(0.007) (0.007) (0.023) (0.006) (0.007) (0.020)
Highest grade obtained in household 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Total plot area in hectares, 2004 survey 0.046*** 0.036*** 0.092*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.031
(0.011) (0.012) (0.033) (0.009) (0.010) (0.035)
Fraction of total land that is good or medium quality 0.001 0.021 0.029 0.020 0.022 0.039
(0.053) (0.070) (0.090) (0.055) (0.071) (0.083)
Dummy for land quartile 1, 2004 survey 0.034 0.002 0.171** 0.009 0.017 0.025
(0.042) (0.052) (0.086) (0.041) (0.051) (0.084)
Dummy for land quartile 2, 2004 survey 0.033 0.030 0.071 0.003 0.021 0.063
(0.043) (0.051) (0.092) (0.040) (0.045) (0.090)
Dummy for land quartile 3, 2004 survey 0.015 0.023 0.007 0.018 0.021 0.006
(0.040) (0.045) (0.094) (0.037) (0.043) (0.085)
Total livestock holdings, 2004 survey (tropical livestock units) 0.003 0.004 0.016 0.001 0.007 0.016*
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Presence of female members in the LAC 0.406*** 0.541*** 0.516** 0.203* 0.234* 0.375*
(0.127) (0.135) (0.241) (0.104) (0.135) (0.194)
Member of an iddir, 2004 survey 0.126* 0.129 0.150 0.173*** 0.261*** 0.111
(0.069) (0.092) (0.115) (0.064) (0.085) (0.108)
Network size, 2004 survey 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005)
Aware of the land registration process 0.066 0.113 0.000 0.058 0.114 0.005
(0.069) (0.089) (0.110) (0.058) (0.078) (0.086)
Observations 970 657 313 964 658 306
R-squared 0.243 0.287 0.233 0.282 0.317 0.338
Source: ERHS and authors’ computation.
Notes: ***, **, and * represent statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The number of observations in columns (1) and (4) represents the
sample for which we have all set of covariates and outcome variables. The number of observations in columns (2) (3) and (5) (6) represents the male-
(female-) headed households in the sample.
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shift in perceptions toward a more equal distribution of assets
upon divorce. This “female in LAC” eﬀect is robust to inclu-
sion of village ﬁxed eﬀects, which implies that even after con-
trolling for local norms regarding the distribution of assets
upon divorce, and the possibility that female members are
more likely to be appointed in poorer villages with higher rates
of female-headship, the presence of females in an important
village-level committee may provide support to women and
also may be a source of information regarding the new Family
Code.
These ﬁndings are particularly important when viewed in
the light of recent recommendations in a report on land ten-
ure and property rights with special emphasis on vulnerable
groups (Katz, 2010). This report, which identiﬁes “women”
as one of many vulnerable groups, argues that policy makers
have to pay extra attention to these vulnerable groups when
designing land reforms so that they will not be adversely
aﬀected by such reforms. Among the recommendations from
the report’s analysis of gender and land policy at a global
level is the importance of a gender progressive legal frame-
work, especially in relation to marital property rights and
inheritance rights. This is relevant to the Ethiopian context,
where changes to the Family Law preceded the land registra-
tion. There is also evidence that the two reforms, taken indi-vidually, had positive gendered impacts. Studies on the land
registration process indicate that it was largely beneﬁcial to
women and that increased tenure security enabled them to
rent out their land (Holden et al., 2007). The research on fam-
ily law shows that it led to greater participation by women in
the labor force and that adverse perceptions of divorce out-
comes have long-term consequences on children’s schooling
outcomes (Hallward-Driemeier & Gajigo, 2011; Kumar &
Quisumbing (2012)). Our analysis suggests that, taken
together, the reform of the Family Code and the commu-
nity-based land registration process may have mutually rein-
forcing eﬀects on women’s rights and welfare. Despite the
long history of gender discrimination in property rights in
Ethiopia, these reforms, and recent increased attention to
women in agricultural development programs, illustrate that
perhaps, little by little, progress is being made—or, to quote
an Ethiopian saying, the egg is beginning to walk. While this
example is obviously rooted in the Ethiopian context, it raises
the possibility that similar reform eﬀorts may be complemen-
tary in other countries as well. Given the potential gains
derived from eliminating the gender gap in access to assets
and resources (FAO, 2011; World Bank, 2011), exploiting
complementarities in the reform process may be an untapped
opportunity to accelerate progress in closing the gender gap
worldwide.
422 WORLD DEVELOPMENTNOTES1. The review of gender and property rights institutions draws on
previous work by one of the authors, in Fafchamps and Quisumbing
(2002).
2. The 1997 round of the ERHS included detailed marital histories and
questions about assets brought to marriage by each spouse. The 1997
round also included questions on what respondents perceived to be the
disposition of assets upon marital dissolution (whether death or divorce).
These are discussed in Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2002). The same
questions were asked in the 2009 round, after the passage of the Family
Law and the land registration.
3. This historical review draws heavily from Deininger, Ali, Holden, and
Zevenbergen (2008).
4. The number of observations reported in the regression tables is about
1,000 because we have the complete set of covariates for that many
households.
5. The ethnic and religious mix of the sample, for instance, does not
match what we know of rural Ethiopia: Oromos are underrepresented;
Protestants are overrepresented. The small number of Oromo sites is in
part due to civil unrest at the time when the initial sample was drawn.
Several villages from the Oromo region have been added to the 2000
survey round.
6. In comparison to the DHS, households in our sample are older and
larger, reﬂecting the fact that the ﬁrst 8 villages in the panel were surveyed
in 1989, and additional 7 villages added in 2004. Although the female
heads in DHS sample have more education than the female heads in our
data, household education levels are higher in our sample.
7. We only collected perceptions data from female spouses or female
heads of households because the modules on family history and disposition
of assets upon marital dissolution upon divorce were only collected from
women in the 1997 round. This was because the rest of the questionnaire,
which focused on consumption, agricultural production, and otherinformation related to rural livelihoods, was administered primarily to
men and we did not want to create excessive burden on respondents. While
it would have been ideal to have this information for men and women alike,
this is one of the constraints imposed by the dataset.
8. We realize that including village ﬁxed eﬀects only allows us to capture
time-invariant unobservables, and not, for example, changes in gender
norms over time. Moreover, because we are using changes in perceptions
as a function of previous period characteristics, we are, strictly speaking,
not estimating a panel data model.
9. Some of this may be driven by respondent bias, since the agriculture
module of our survey was administered to the household head.
10. While these low numbers may raise doubts about survey implemen-
tation, these results are not surprising to those familiar with the land
registration process. The land registration process in Tigray, which started
much earlier, was very rushed and took place without photos, public
awareness campaigns, or area measurement. This implies that land records
were often out of date and that most of the farmers viewed the land
certiﬁcate issued by this process as one of many certiﬁcates that they might
have received in the past. That is, they may not have associated the land
certiﬁcate they had in their possession with the community land
registration eﬀort (Klaus Deininger, personal communication, February
13, 2010).
11. This index is created by aggregating responses to questions relating to
knowledge and participation in the land registration process (these
questions are shown in Rows 1–5 in Table 5).
12. Even though the land registration process occurred after the
enactment of new Family Law we examine the impact of measures related
to the land registration process as of 2009 on changes in perceptions
regarding the Family Law during 1997–2009.
13. We note, however, that including these ﬁxed eﬀects does not correct
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